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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Devonte Carter was charged with three drug offenses and, separately, with 
intimidation of a witness. He initially proceeded to trial on the drug offenses only, and 
the district court declared a mistrial after a hung jury. The cases were consolidated for a 
second jury trial. The second trial also resulted in a mistrial during voir dire. At the third 
trial, the district court declared another mistrial due to Mr. Carter’s alleged discovery 
violations for the late disclosure of two additional witness and tangible evidence. After 
the third mistrial, Mr. Carter moved to dismiss the charges pursuant to the double 
jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment. The district court denied the motion, and 
Mr. Carter entered a conditional guilty plea. On appeal, Mr. Carter asserts that the 
district court erred by denying his motion because the double jeopardy clause bars 
retrial after the third mistrial. 
  
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
According to police reports, Mr. Carter sold $20 worth of methamphetamine to a 
confidential informant at a residence in Post Falls, Idaho, on two occasions in late July 
of 2014. (43850 R.,1 pp.23–24.) After the two controlled buys, police obtained a search 
warrant for the Post Falls residence. (43850 R., pp.24–25.) During the search, police 
found a baggie of a crystal white material in a pair of male shorts on a chair in the 
basement bedroom. (43850 R., p.25.) The police were informed that Mr. Carter lived in 
                                            
1 There are two separate Clerk’s Records on appeal. Citations to “43850 R.” refer to the 
Clerk’s Record in CR 2014-14943 (drug offenses). Citations to “43851 R.” refer to the 
Clerk’s Record in CR 2014-21584 (intimidation of a witness). 
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this basement bedroom with another individual. (43850 R., p.26.) The material tested 
presumptively positive for methamphetamine. (43850 R., p.25.) Mr. Carter was arrested 
for the methamphetamine found in the shorts and the two controlled buys. (43850 
R., p.26.)  
The State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging Mr. Carter committed two counts of 
delivery of a controlled substance, in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(a), and one count of 
possession of a controlled substance, in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1). (43850 
R., pp.42–43.) The magistrate held a preliminary hearing and found probable cause for 
the alleged offenses. (43850 R., pp.83–90, 91.) Mr. Carter was bound over to district 
court. (43850 R., p.91.) The State filed an Information charging Mr. Carter with two 
counts of delivery and one count of possession. (43850 R., pp.98–99; see also pp.155–
56 (Amended Information).) In October of 2014, Mr. Carter entered a plea of not guilty, 
and the case was set for trial (“drug case”). (R., pp.101, 102–03, 106.)  
 Then, in November of 2014, the State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging 
Mr. Carter committed the crime of intimidation of witness, in violation of I.C. § 18-
2604(3). (43851 R., pp.17–18.) According to police reports, Mr. Carter made multiple 
threats to harm the confidential informant, who was incarcerated in the same jail as 
Mr. Carter. (43851 R., pp.12–13.) Mr. Carter waived a preliminary hearing, and the 
magistrate bound him over to district court. (43851 R., pp.38–39.) The State filed an 
Information charging Mr. Carter with intimidation (“intimidation case”). (43851 R., pp.40–
41.) Mr. Carter entered a plea of not guilty. (43851 R., p.42.)  
In February of 2015, the district court held a two-day jury trial in the drug case. 
(43850 R., pp.131–35, 168–78.) The trial resulted in a hung jury. (43850 R., p.207.) The 
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State moved to set the drug case for a second trial and to join the drug case with the 
intimidation case. (43850 R., pp.208, 210; 43851 R., p.44.) The district court granted the 
State’s motion. (43850 R., pp.212, 213; 43851 R., p.46.)   
A second trial was set for July of 2015. (43850 R., p.257; 43851 R., p.61.) On the 
first day of trial, the district court declared a mistrial due to a prospective juror’s 
statement during voir dire. (43850 R., pp.257–58; 43851 R., pp.61–62.) The district 
court set a third trial. (43850 R., pp.259, 264, 270; 43851 R., pp.68, 69.)  
The third trial began in late September of 2015. (43850 R., p.276; 43851 
R., p.71.) In the State’s case-in-chief, two police officers testified to their discovery of 
the baggie of methamphetamine in the shorts in the basement bedroom of the Post 
Falls residence. (Tr., p.33, L.3–p.36, L.8, p.38, L.8–p.41, L.11, p.46, Ls.11–16, p.111, 
Ls.10–19.) The police explained that the shorts were on a chair with other clothing and 
items. (Tr., p.111, Ls.10–19; State’s Exs.9–12.) The shorts were a size 44. (Tr., p.113, 
Ls.11–19; State’s Exs. 9, 10.) Also on the chair, but not in the shorts, were a social 
security card and Idaho identification card belonging to Mr. Carter. (Tr., p.111, Ls.13–
14, p.111–8; State’s Ex. 11–12.) The officers also testified that Mr. Carter had exited 
from the basement area at the start of the search. (Tr., p.34, L.3–p.35, L.9, p.107, L.1–
p.108, L.25.)  
During cross-examination of one of the police officers, defense counsel 
introduced evidence of the shorts worn by Mr. Carter during the search of the Post Falls 
residence in order to show that the shorts with the methamphetamine did not belong to 
Mr. Carter. Specifically, defense counsel intended to show that, while the shorts with the 
methamphetamine were a size 44, the shorts worn by Mr. Carter during the search were 
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a size 38. To this end, defense counsel presented to the officer the tangible item of the 
shorts worn by Mr. Carter during the search. (Tr., p.126, L.4–p.127, L.18.) Defense 
counsel then asked the officer what were the size of the shorts. (Tr., p.127, Ls.19–20.) 
The State objected as to foundation. (Tr., p.127, L.21–p.128, L.1.) Defense counsel 
explained, “This is all foundational. We’ll be linking it up later with another witness.” 
(Tr., p.128, Ls.2–4.) The district court overruled the objection. (Tr., p.128, L.5.) The 
officer testified that these tangible shorts were a size 38 (“size 38 shorts”). (Tr., p.128, 
Ls.6–8.)   
At the start of the second day of trial, Mr. Carter filed a supplemental witness list 
identifying two additional witnesses. (43850 R., pp.286–87; 43851 R., pp.83–84.) 
According to Mr. Carter, these witnesses would be used primarily as rebuttal or 
impeachment witnesses to the State’s key witness, the confidential informant who 
allegedly participated in two controlled buys with Mr. Carter. (Tr., p.138, L.13–p.139, 
L.7, p.145, Ls.7–20, p.149, L.9–p.151, L.12, p.152, L.9–p.153, L.8.) The State filed a 
Motion in Limine and Request for Discovery Sanctions and to Strike Improperly 
Introduced Evidence in Lieu of Declaring a Mistrial. (43850 R., pp.288–93.) The State 
argued that Mr. Carter violated Idaho Criminal Rule 16 due to the late disclosure of two 
witnesses, as well as the size 38 shorts. (43850 R., pp.289–91.) The State requested 
that, in lieu of a mistrial, the district court grant its motion to bar Mr. Carter from 
introducing any testimony from the two witnesses and the size 38 shorts. (43850 
R., pp.292–93.) The State also requested a curative instruction on the size 38 shorts. 
(43850 R., pp.292–93.)  
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Before calling in the jury, the district court took up the State’s motion. The State 
argued for sanctions for the discovery violations, including a mistrial. (Tr., p.130, L.9–
p.137, L.20.) Mr. Carter argued against the State’s allegations of any discovery 
violations. (Tr., p.137, L.24–p.145, L.25, p.149, L.9–p.153, L.8.) The district court 
reasoned that the two witnesses and the physical evidence of the size 38 shorts were 
key to Mr. Carter’s defense, so to exclude this evidence could infringe on Mr. Carter’s 
right to a fair trial and present a defense. (Tr., p.153, L.9–p.156, L.8.) The district court 
also reasoned that the State “had a legitimate interest in having the defense comply 
with the Criminal Rules” and the State would be unprepared to cross-examine the two 
witnesses.2 (Tr., p.153, L.9–p.156, L.8.) The district court noted that if it excluded the 
testimony of two witnesses and size 38 shorts, instead of declaring a mistrial, there 
would be a cognizable claim for post-conviction relief. (Tr., p.156, L.1–8.) The district 
court declared a mistrial. (Tr., p.156, Ls.9–11.) 
In early November of 2015, Mr. Carter filed a motion to dismiss the charges in 
both cases on double jeopardy grounds. (43850 R., pp.305–318; 43851 R., pp.96–109.) 
Mr. Carter argued that the late disclosures did not violate the discovery rules, any 
discovery violation did not warrant a mistrial as the sanction, and the mistrial was not 
justified by manifest necessity, thus prohibiting the State from a retrial on the charges 
                                            
2 The district court did not explicitly address the prejudice to the State due to the late 
disclosure of the size 38 shorts. (See Tr., p.153, L.9–p.156, L.18.) Mr. Carter had 
explained that he obtained the size 38 shorts out of jail property—he was wearing the 
shorts when the police arrested him. (Tr., p.139, L.13–p.140, L.3; p.151, L.13–p.152, 
L.8.) The State had argued, with respect to its prejudice, that it did not “have the 
advantage to go and see whether that happened, who released it, when it was released, 
[and] are those exactly the same shorts or not.” (Tr., p.147, L.20–p.148, L.3.)  
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against Mr. Carter. (43850 R., pp.307–318; 43851 R., pp.98–109.) The district court 
denied the motion. (Tr., p.163, L.18; 43850 R., pp.340–41.)  
The State and Mr. Carter then entered into a conditional binding Rule 11 plea 
agreement. (43850 R., pp.329–31, 333; Tr., p.164, L.11–p.165, L9.) In the drug case, 
Mr. Carter would plead guilty to one count of delivery of a controlled substance. (43850 
R., pp.326 (Second Amended Information), 329–30.) The State would dismiss the 
remaining drug offenses with prejudice, as well as the charge of intimidation of a 
witness in the intimidation case. (43850 R., pp.322, 324, 330; 43851 R., pp.113, 115.) 
Mr. Carter also reserved his right to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion 
to dismiss. (43850 R., p.329; Tr., p.164, Ls.10–15.) If Mr. Carter prevailed on appeal, he 
would be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. (43850 R., p.329.). The district court 
accepted Mr. Carter’s guilty plea.3 (Tr., p.170, L.22–p.171, L.2, p.171, Ls.6–10.) 
Mr. Carter waived the presentence investigation, and the district court proceeded 
directly to sentencing. (Tr., p.171, Ls.11–21.) The district court sentenced Mr. Carter to 
twelve years, with four years fixed, for delivery of a controlled substance. (Tr., p.173, 
Ls.9–24; 43850 R., pp.334–38.) Mr. Carter filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the 
district court’s Judgment and Sentence in both cases. (43850 R., pp.342–45; 43851 
R., pp.119–21.)  
 
                                            
3 As part of the plea agreement, Mr. Carter also pled guilty to misdemeanor assault 
(amended from kidnapping) in CR 2014-16617. (43850 R., pp.330, 333; Tr., p.164, 
Ls.19–21, p.168, L.18–p.169, L.10, p.171, Ls.3–5.) This case was not joined with the 
proceedings at issue here, and it is not before the Court on appeal.  
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Carter’s motion to dismiss?  
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Carter’s Motion To Dismiss 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 Mr. Carter asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss the 
charges in the drug case and the intimidation case. The Fifth Amendment’s double 
jeopardy clause bars retrial after a mistrial unless the State can show manifest 
necessity for the mistrial. Here, the mistrial was not justified by manifest necessity 
because the district court abused its discretion by declaring a mistrial as the remedy for 
the alleged discovery violations. Because the State cannot show manifest necessity, the 
double jeopardy clause prohibits Mr. Carter’s retrial. The district court therefore should 
have granted his motion to dismiss. 
  
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “The choice of an appropriate sanction, or whether to impose a sanction at all, for 
a party’s failure to comply with a discovery request or order is within the discretion of the 
trial court.” State v. Wilson, 158 Idaho 585, 588 (Ct. App. 2015). Similarly, the Court 
reviews the district court’s decision to declare a mistrial for an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 342 (2005).  
In determining whether the district court abused its discretion, the 
reviewing court considers the following: (1) whether the district court 
correctly perceived that the issue was one of discretion; (2) whether the 
district court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices 
available to it; and (3) whether the district court reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason.  
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Id. (citing Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 156 (2002)). The Court exercises free review 
over questions of law. See State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 63 (Ct. App. 2000) 
(“[W]hether an appellant’s prosecution complies with the constitutional protection 
against being placed in jeopardy twice is a question of law subject to free review.”). 
 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Carter’s Motion To Dismiss Because 
The Double Jeopardy Clause Prohibits Retrial After A Mistrial That Is Not 
Justified By Manifest Necessity  
 
 “The double jeopardy clauses in the Idaho and federal constitutions prohibit 
putting one in jeopardy twice for the same crime. This protection applies not only to 
multiple punishments, but also to multiple prosecutions for the same crimes.” State v. 
Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 343 (2005) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 
13; United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993); State v. Avelar, 132 Idaho 775, 
778 (1999)). “The multiple prosecution component of double jeopardy ‘ensures that the 
State does not make repeated attempts to convict an individual, thereby exposing him 
to continued embarrassment, anxiety, and expense, while increasing the risk of an 
erroneous conviction or an impermissibly enhanced sentence.’” Avelar, 132 Idaho at 
778 (quoting Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498–99 (1984)).  
 “[A]s a general rule, the prosecutor is entitled to one, and only one, opportunity to 
require an accused to stand trial.” Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978). 
This general rule “does not mean that a criminal defendant is entitled to go free every 
time a trial fails to end in a final judgment.” Manley, 142 Idaho at 344. “Unlike the 
situation in which the trial has ended in an acquittal or conviction, retrial is not 
automatically barred when a criminal proceeding is terminated without finally resolving 
the merits of the charges against the accused.” Washington, 434 U.S. at 505. “A 
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criminal defendant may be retried if the first trial was prematurely terminated by the 
district court, without the defendant’s consent, due to ‘manifest necessity.’” Manley, 142 
Idaho at 344 (quoting United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824)). 
Retrial is permitted after a “manifest necessity” mistrial because the defendant’s “valued 
right to have the trial concluded by a particular tribunal is sometimes subordinate to the 
public interest in affording the prosecutor one full and fair opportunity to present his 
evidence to an impartial jury.” Washington, 434 U.S. at 505.  
 The burden to demonstrate “manifest necessity” rests on the State. See State v. 
Sharp, 104 Idaho 691, 693 (1983). As the United States Supreme Court explained in 
Washington: 
[I]n view of the importance of the right, and the fact that it is frustrated by 
any mistrial, the prosecutor must shoulder the burden of justifying the 
mistrial if he is to avoid the double jeopardy bar. His burden is a heavy 
one. The prosecutor must demonstrate “manifest necessity” for any 
mistrial declared over the objection of the defendant. . . . The words 
“manifest necessity” appropriately characterize the magnitude of the 
prosecutor’s burden. 
 
434 U.S. at 505. Here, the State requested a mistrial as a potential sanction for the 
alleged discovery violations by Mr. Carter. (Tr., p.137, Ls.15–20.) Mr. Carter challenged 
the State’s claim of any discovery violations to justify the State’s requested sanctions. 
(Tr., p.137, L.24–p.145, L.25, p.149, L.9–p.153, L.8.) Therefore, the State has the 
burden to show manifest necessity warranted the mistrial. 
  
1. The State Cannot Show Manifest Necessity For The Mistrial Because The 
District Court Abused Its Discretion By Declaring The Mistrial As The 
Sanction Mr. Carter’s Alleged Discovery Violations 
 
 The Court has described the manifest necessity standard as follows:  
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The basic rule is that criminal actions may be terminated by a mistrial 
without double jeopardy consequences if there is a sufficiently compelling 
reason to do so, some procedural error or other problem obstructing a full 
and fair adjudication of the case which is serious enough to outweigh the 
interest of the defendant in obtaining a final resolution of the charges 
against him—what is commonly termed a “manifest necessity” or “legal 
necessity.” The courts have generally declined to lay out any bright-line 
rule as to what constitutes “manifest necessity,” but have based their 
decisions on the facts of each case, looking to such factors as [1] whether 
the problem could be adequately resolved by any less drastic alternative 
action; [2] whether it would necessarily have led to a reversal on appeal if 
the trial had continued and the defendant had been convicted; [3] whether 
it reflected bad faith or oppressive conduct on the part of the prosecution; 
[4] whether or not it had been declared in the interest of the defendant; 
and [5] whether and to what extent the defendant would be prejudiced by 
a second trial. Since the trial judge is ordinarily in the best position to 
observe the circumstances which allegedly call for a mistrial, his or her 
judgment as to the necessity for a mistrial is commonly deferred to; but 
that judgment may be set aside if the reviewing court finds that the judge 
has abused this discretionary power, particularly where it appears that the 
judge has not “scrupulously” exercised his or her discretion by making a 
full inquiry into all the pertinent circumstances and deliberately considering 
the options available . . . .  
 
Manley, 142 Idaho at 344 (quoting State v. Stevens, 126 Idaho 822, 826 (1995) 
(omission in original)). Although the district court has a wide range of discretion, a 
mistrial declaration “cannot be condoned” “if a trial judge acts ‘irrationally or 
irresponsibly.’” Id. at 345 (quoting Washington, 434 U.S. at 514).  
 Here, the district court declared the mistrial due to Mr. Carter’s late disclosure of 
two witnesses and the size 38 shorts. Idaho Criminal Rule 16 allows the district court to 
impose sanctions for a discovery violation such as the late disclosure of evidence. 
I.C.R. 16(f)(2); State v. Wilson, 158 Idaho 585, 588 (Ct. App. 2015); State v. Johnson, 
149 Idaho 259, 264 (Ct. App. 2010). Exclusion of the evidence is the most severe 
sanction. Johnson, 149 Idaho at 264. When determining a sanction for late disclosure, 
the district court “must weigh the prejudice to the State against the defendant’s right to a 
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fair trial.” Id. Additionally, the district court must “consider whether less severe remedies 
would be sufficient for untimely disclosure, such as a short continuance, a mistrial, or 
sanctions against defense counsel” before excluding the evidence. Id.  
 In this case, the district court abused its discretion by declaring the mistrial as the 
discovery sanction in two ways. First, the district court did not act consistently with the 
applicable legal standards because it failed to consider alternative remedies for the 
discovery violation. Second, the district court did not provide Mr. Carter with an 
adequate opportunity to be heard on the remedy, which also was inconsistent with the 
applicable legal standards. 
 The district court must consider alternative remedies in its discretionary decision 
to impose a sanction. Johnson, 149 Idaho at 264; see also State v. Winson, 129 Idaho 
298, 303 (Ct. App. 1996) (magistrate’s exclusion of witness was an abuse of discretion 
for, in part, failing to consider less severe sanctions). Here, the district court considered 
only two remedies—mistrial or exclusion—for Mr. Carter’s alleged discovery violation.4 
(Tr., p.155, L.6–p.156, L.11.) Other remedies required consideration, however. For 
example, a brief recess or continuance would have been appropriate in order for the 
State to investigate the two witnesses and obtain impeachment material. Similarly, the 
tangible evidence of the size 38 shorts could have been excluded, and a curative 
instruction given. But the district court did not consider these options. (See Tr., p.153, 
L.9–p.156, L.18.) Rather, the record shows that the district court incorrectly viewed the 
appropriate remedy as an either-or decision: it could declare a mistrial or exclude the 
                                            
4 Further, when the district court later determined there was “manifest necessity” for the 
mistrial, the district court again discussed only the exclusion and mistrial remedy 
options. (Tr., p.159, L.20–163, L.17.) 
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evidence. This was inconsistent with the legal standards requiring the district court to 
consider all alternative remedies to a mistrial. See Manley, 142 Idaho at 345. 
 What is more, the district court did not give Mr. Carter an opportunity to comment 
on the appropriate remedy. “In making the manifest necessity determination, a district 
court ought to obtain sufficient information to enable it to consider alternatives to a 
mistrial and give counsel a timely and meaningful opportunity to be heard on the 
subject.” Id. (emphasis added). The defendant has a “significant interest in the decision 
whether or not to take the case from the jury when circumstances occur which might be 
thought to warrant a declaration of a mistrial.” Stevens, 126 Idaho at 827. Here, 
Mr. Carter argued against the State’s allegation that he committed any discovery 
violations in the first place. (Tr., p.137, L.24–p.145, L.25, p.149, L.9–p.153, L.8.) But, in 
deciding the matter, the district court immediately turned to the remedy for the late 
disclosure without giving Mr. Carter a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the 
alternatives to a mistrial. (Tr., p.153, L.9–p.156, L.18.)  
 Indeed, a defendant “may not consent to a mistrial for many reasons”—“an 
accused may have valid personal reasons for preferring to go ahead with the trial rather 
than starting all over again, such as a desire to minimize the attendant embarrassment, 
expense and anxiety.” Stevens, 126 Idaho at 827 (quoting Curry v. Superior Court of 
S.F., 470 P.2d 345, 367 (Cal. 1970) (en banc)). “These considerations . . . are peculiarly 
within the knowledge of the accused, not the judge, and the latter must avoid depriving 
the accused of his constitutionally protected freedom of choice in the name of a 
paternalistic concern for his welfare.” Id. These “valid personal reasons” could not be 
more prevalent in a case like this, where Mr. Carter was on his third trial. As stated in 
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his motion to dismiss, Mr. Carter would have preferred the exclusion of the male 38 
shorts as opposed to a mistrial.5 (43850 R., pp.309–10.) Likewise, Mr. Carter also 
preferred other remedies for the late disclosure of the two witnesses, such as a 
continuance or even exclusion. (43850 R., p.309.) Still more, the State also viewed a 
mistrial as the most severe remedy and preferred other remedies. (Tr., p.130, Ls.10–12, 
p.137, Ls.15–20.) Thus, the district court’s failure to consider all remedies and to give 
Mr. Carter an opportunity to address the subject before declaring a mistrial was an 
abuse of discretion.  
 Because the district court abused its discretion in declaring a mistrial, the State 
cannot show manifest necessity to allow the retrial of Mr. Carter. The “doctrine of 
manifest necessity stands as a command to trial judges not to foreclose the defendant’s 
option [‘to go to a particular tribunal’] until a scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion 
leads to the conclusion that the ends of public justice would not be served by a 
continuation of the proceedings.” United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971) 
(plurality opinion). The “power” to declare a mistrial must “be used with the greatest 
caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes.” Perez, 22 
U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 580. Thus, if the trial court fails to “exercise a sound discretion” in 
declaring the mistrial, the trial court has acted “irrationally” or “irresponsibly” and thus 
the manifest necessity standard cannot be satisfied. Manley, 142 Idaho at 344–45 (no 
manifest necessary for district court’s sua sponte declaration of mistrial because the 
court did not “adequately consider[ ] and then reject[ ] alternatives” or give the 
                                            
5 Mr. Carter explained that the admission of the size 38 shorts was unnecessary to his 
defense because Mr. Carter could testify as to the size of his shorts. (43850 R., pp.309–
10.) 
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defendant “a chance to be heard”); Stevens, 126 Idaho at 827–30 (no manifest 
necessity for trial judge’s sua sponte declaration of mistrial because judge made “no 
inquiry into all pertinent circumstances,” did not consider “all available options,” or allow 
counsel “meaningful opportunity to be heard”); see also Jorn, 400 U.S. at 487 (plurality 
opinion) (no manifest necessity for trial judge’s sua sponte declaration of mistrial 
because judge gave “no consideration” on the record to possibility of trial continuance 
and gave prosecutor and defense no opportunity to respond). Absent manifest 
necessity for the mistrial, the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits 
retrial of the charges against Mr. Carter. See Manley, 142 Idaho at 344, 346; Stevens, 
126 Idaho at 830; see also Washington, 434 U.S. at 505; Jorn, 400 U.S. at 487. 
Therefore, the district court erred by denying Mr. Carter’s motion to dismiss. His motion 
“should have been granted” because “further prosecution” of the crimes “is barred by 
the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.” Manley, 142 Idaho at 346. 
  
CONCLUSION 
 Mr. Carter respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order 
denying his motion to dismiss and vacate his judgment and sentence in CR 2014-
14943.  
 DATED this 12th day of July, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      JENNY C. SWINFORD 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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